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Abstract: 
We report experiments that examine trader reaction to ambiguity when dividend 
information is revealed sequentially. We find that experienced traders are better at 
internalizing ambiguity than inexperienced subjects. No significant differences are 
observed in the ambiguity versus control treatments regarding prices, price volatility and 
volumes for experienced subjects. However, relative to the control, prices are higher, 
volatility greater and trading unsophisticated for inexperienced subjects in the ambiguity 
treatment. Price changes are consistent with news revelation regardless of subject 
experience and the degree of ambiguity. Further, we do not find under or over price 
reactions to news. Regardless of experience, market reaction to news moves in line with 
fundamentals. 
Keywords: experimental asset markets, ambiguity, market communications, bounded rationality. 
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I. Introduction 
I.1. Ambiguity and reaction to news 
Recent research in behavioral finance has challenged the predictions of standard 
finance models putting forward the existence of financial anomalies such as the over- and 
under-reaction of asset prices to news. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show 
under-reaction when average post-event returns hold the same sign as pre-event date 
returns. Meanwhile, in their classic study, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) show price over-
reaction to information where price movements exhibit disproportional changes followed 
by subsequent reversions. Shefrin (2000), meanwhile, points out that investors over-react to 
negative news. Under-reaction tends to occur at short horizons while over-reaction occurs 
at longer horizons (p 87). These empirical results contrast with Fama’s (1998) claim that 
“apparent over-reaction of stock prices to information is as common as under-reaction.”  
These results have led to the development of alternative models that reproduce some 
of these anomalies. Incorporating cognitive biases, behavioral theories have shown the 
presence of under- and over-reaction in asset prices. In particular, Daniel et al. (1998) 
examine investor overconfidence bias in how traders incorporate new information in their 
decision calculus. Biased self-attribution reinforces over-confidence and results in under-
reaction to public, and over-reaction to private, information. Barberis et al. (1998) apply the 
conservatism and representative bias (i.e. new information is underweighted in updating) to 
investor decisions. Slow information updating of prior beliefs results in price under-
reaction to new information. Over-reaction occurs as a result of the “representativeness 
bias” by which traders extrapolate trends in asset prices from very small samples of 
observations. Frazzini (2006), meanwhile, proposes that the presence of the “disposition 
effect” depresses prices with traders trying to lock in gains. In addition, a reluctance to sell 
at a capital loss allows prices to hold steady on bad news. Prices thus exhibit under-reaction 
due to this psychological bias. 
In this paper, we follow a different route, instead of bringing multiple psychological 
biases into the analysis we consider whether the introduction of ambiguity may reproduce 
some of the anomalies that have been documented regarding asset price reaction to news. In 
that respect our research fits with the argument that a possible account for financial   3
anomalies can be the existence of unmodeled risk factors such as ambiguity that can be 
interpreted as an additional factor regarding the evaluation of risk. 
Following previous research on ambiguity, we use Ellsberg’s procedure to introduce 
ambiguity in an experimental asset market where public information is sequentially 
released to traders. Our experimental design allows us to study how individual traders react 
to news in a context in which they receive information regarding dividend realizations. In 
our experiments, either the underlying process that generates dividends comes from a 
known probability distribution or is ambiguous. 
In the baseline experiment, the probability distribution of dividends is publicly 
known, and subjects are informed that the dividend realization may be from two different 
regimes with high and low values, respectively. Subjects are aware about the two different 
regimes and are told the actual regime at the end of the first period. Given the information, 
subjects then trade in period two. At the end of the second trading period, participants are 
informed which of the dividends in the announced (dividend) regime will not be realized. 
The final dividend is realized at the end of period three. In the ambiguity treatment, the 
probability of occurrence of the two different dividend regimes is left unknown. 
Specifically, we tell subjects that a given regime of dividends will be selected at the end of 
the first period of trading by drawing a marble of a certain color from an opaque bag 
containing colored marbles with unknown quantities and proportions. Given that it has been 
shown that experience can be relevant in understanding trading behaviors experimental 
asset markets (Smith et al. (1988), Lei et al. (2001), Dufwenberg et al. (2005)) we repeat 
the experimental sessions so as to control for the effect of experience.  
Our design enables us to study how ambiguity regarding the fundamental value of 
an asset affects trader reaction to public news. Furthermore, we can also study how 
ambiguity is reflected in market variables such as prices, price volatility and trading 
volumes. We test the following hypotheses that are motivated by the theoretical literature 
mentioned earlier. Our first hypothesis relates to research showing ambiguity aversion in 
the domain of gains in a lottery context (Ellsberg (1961), Yates and Zukowski (1976), 
Curley and Yates (1985), Cohen, Tallon and Vergnaud (2009)) and experimental markets 
(Sarin and Weber, (1993)).   4
Hypothesis 1: Regardless of subject experience, we expect asset prices to exhibit an 
ambiguity premium. That is, average asset prices under the ambiguity treatment are 
expected to be lower than the baseline treatment. 
Our second hypothesis is related to theoretical results that predict that ambiguity can 
lead to inertia in trading behavior (Dow and Werlang 1992, Mukerji and Tallon 2001). 
Further, due to the indeterminacy in equilibrium prices (that may leave the determination of 
asset price equilibria to animal spirits) asset price volatility is expected to rise in the 
presence of ambiguity (Epstein and Wang 1994). This leads us to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: 
i) Regardless of subject experience, we expect ambiguity to increase volatility in asset 
markets (Epstein and Wang, 1994). 
ii) Regardless of subject experience, we expect ambiguity to reduce trading volumes in 
asset prices (Dow and Werlang 1992, Mukerji and Tallon 2001). 
In terms of reactions to news, we examine the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: i) Regardless of subject experience, asset prices in both the baseline and the 
ambiguity treatments increase (decrease) after good (bad) news is released. 
ii) Regardless of subject experience, asset prices in both the baseline and the ambiguity 
treatments do not exhibit either under- or over-reaction to news. 
Notice that Hypothesis 3 ii) relies on Fama’s conjecture that, regardless of the treatment, 
reaction to news should be consistent with news content and exhibit neither under- nor 
over-reaction (Fama, 1998). 
We also study individual trading behavior and base our hypothesis on Epstein and 
Wang (1994). They show that, because of the possible indeterminacy in equilibrium prices, 
the determination of asset prices may be driven by animal spirits. As a result, we expect 
that trader behavior is less consistent and (less) rational under the ambiguity treatment. 
Note that, we define subject trading behavior as being inconsistent in a given period 
whenever subjects are willing to sell the asset at a price lower than what they would be   5
willing to pay for it. The analysis follows the definitions of absolute and average 
inconsistent trading behavior. 
Hypothesis 4: Regardless of subject experience, compared to the baseline, subject trading 
behavior is more likely to be inconsistent with rationality under the ambiguity treatment. 
In contrast with the existing literature that considers lottery choices we find the 
absence of any ambiguity premium in asset prices. Surprisingly, inexperienced subjects 
generate prices closer to fundamental value relative to the baseline treatment in the 
ambiguity treatment. Also, we do not observe a reduction of trading volumes (Dow and 
Werlang (1992) and in Mukerji and Tallon (2001)). We confirm the increased volatility 
predicted by Epstein and Wang (1994) as well as the exacerbation of animal spirits in the 
presence of ambiguity with inexperienced traders. This is the case because, compared to the 
baseline treatment, in the ambiguity treatment inexperienced traders tend to be more likely 
to exhibit unsophisticated trading behavior. For example, under ambiguity, inexperienced 
traders are more likely to resell an asset at the end of a period at a lower price than what 
they paid for it at the beginning of the period. Nevertheless, these differences are not 
significant with experience. In addition, the absence of significant differences in the 
reaction to public news (between the baseline and the ambiguity treatment in the case of 
experienced subjects) confirms the limited role of ambiguity in our experimental asset 
markets. We find support for Fama’s assertion that over-reaction should be as common as 
under-reaction. Reaction to news is in line with fundamentals in both treatments, regardless 
of subject experience. 
I.2. Related literature: ambiguity in asset markets 
Standard finance theory and the experimental asset market literature have mostly 
assumed that the probabilistic structure of the process driving the fundamental value of 
financial assets is known. However, a substantial literature that dates back to Ellsberg 
(1961) has shown that ambiguity about the probability of occurrence of lottery outcomes 
may significantly reduce the value assigned to a lottery. Klibanoff et al. (2005) model 
decision makers who do not know the probability of occurrence of each state of the world 
but, hold some prior beliefs regarding different scenarios. Their model (of uncertainty) 
implies that individual decision makers use second-order beliefs. A growing literature has   6
incorporated ambiguity regarding the dividend process (that underlies the fundamental 
value) of an asset in asset pricing models.  
Besides considering ambiguity in the dividend process, recent research has also 
considered the possibility of ambiguous information (Leippold et al. (2007), Epstein and 
Schneider (2008)). In the presence of ambiguous information, Epstein and Schneider 
(2008) are able to account for the equity premium in a simple asset pricing model. Investors 
take the worst-case approach to new information reacting more towards bad, than good, 
news. Such behavior produces an ambiguity premium on these types of assets. Further, 
Leippold et al. (2007) show that asset prices react more strongly to bad news than to good 
news. 
The complexity of modeling uncertainty in real market settings points towards the 
difficulty faced by researchers in testing the existence of ambiguity aversion when first and 
second order individual beliefs are not observable. In this context, experiments offer a 
possible solution as they allow the experimenter to control for uncertainty. For example, 
some experiments have controlled for uncertainty following a procedure similar to Ellsberg 
(1961). Subjects play a lottery that consists in drawing a ball from one of the two urns. The 
number of balls and their color is known in one urn while the color composition is 
unknown in the other urn. In line with Ellsberg, some authors have stressed the presence of 
significant ambiguity aversion (Yates and Zukowski (1976), Curley and Yates (1985), 
Cohen et al. (2009)). Meanwhile, others have argued that ambiguity aversion can be 
dampened, or even eliminated, if ambiguous and unambiguous lotteries are evaluated 
separately (Fox and Tversky (1995), Chow and Sarin (2002)). Also, Cohen et al. (1985) as 
well as Potamites and Zhang (2007) have put forward the heterogeneity in individual 
attitudes towards ambiguity. Camerer and Weber (1992) and Du and Budescu (2005) have 
stressed that ambiguity aversion is more significant in gains than in losses.
1  
Experimental results to date with state ambiguity show lower prices due to 
ambiguity aversion. In Sarin and Weber (1993) ambiguity aversion is reflected in reduced 
asset prices in a sealed bid and a double auction. Their result is particularly strong when the 
                                                            
1 In addition, at the brain level Smith et al. (2002) have reported ambiguity aversion in gains while no 
ambiguity attitudes were identified in the domain of losses.   7
ambiguous and the unambiguous assets are traded simultaneously. Bossaerts et al. (2010) 
also report significant effects of ambiguity in experimental asset markets with portfolio 
choices. Their results are in line with theory (Dow and Werlang (1992), Mukerji and Tallon 
(2001)) stressing that when some state probabilities are not known, agents who are 
sufficiently ambiguity averse may refuse to hold an ambiguous portfolio for a certain range 
of prices. 
 
II. Experimental design 
Six sessions were run in each treatment. In each session the market was repeated. This 
gives us a total of 24 market observations. Subjects were recruited from an undergraduate 
student subject pool at a major US university. Subjects were randomly selected across 
gender and majors. Additionally, to the extent possible, students were recruited based on 
their participation in a battery of risk attitude experiments conducted earlier in the academic 
year. The individual risk attitude battery consisted of a series of one hundred risk choices, 
and it was designed to elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. Specifically, after utilizing econometric 
methods, the data allowed the experimenters to rank the subjects based on the following 
indices: 
•  Overall risk attitude and utility function curvature. 
•  Attitude toward ambiguity. 
Appendix A shows some of the gambles faced by subjects in the battery.
2 The data 
shows that from the subsample for which we had access to ambiguity aversion scores, 33 
out of 60 subjects were ambiguity averse while only 13 exhibited ambiguity-seeking 
behavior.
3 This first step ensures that ambiguity aversion is potentially relevant in our 
experimental sessions and any absence of ambiguity effects cannot be due to the selection 
of a population of traders insensitive to ambiguity that would be insensitive to ambiguity. 
                                                            
2 For more information on these tests, see Dickhaut and Wilcox (2009). 
3 We consider a significance level of 5% (see Dickhaut and Wilcox (2009)).   8
Each experimental session had eight traders. Initial portfolios were structured so 
that three traders were endowed with 450 cents in cash and 3 shares, two with 600 cents in 
cash and 2 shares while, the remaining three traders were endowed with 750 cents in cash 
and one share. Each session consisted of three trading periods lasting 4 minutes each. 
Information concerning the possible per share dividend was released at the end of the first 
and second trading periods. At the end of the third trading period, a final dividend was 
announced and participant profits were given according to the final cash position plus 
dividends earned. Each experiment (see table 1 for experimental details) began with a short 
practice session to allow everyone to become familiar with the trading interface and 
process. Subjects were informed that the final dividend would be selected from one of two 
sets: {50,100,150} or {100,200,300}. Dividend values were expressed in cents. The 
baseline treatment was conducted as follows. 
- At the end of the first trading period a subject was selected at random to flip a coin. If 
the coin came up heads, the dividend was selected from {50,100,150}. If it was tails, the 
dividend came from {100,200,300}. Trading then proceeded to periods 2 and 3. 
- At the end of the second trading period a subject was selected to roll a die. If numbers 
1 or 2 were rolled then the dividend would NOT be the low number in the range. If 
numbers 3 or 4 were rolled the dividend would NOT be the middle number in the range. If 
numbers 5 or 6 were rolled the dividend would NOT be the high number in the range. Note 
that, this procedure further reduces the dividend uncertainty subject’s face. Trade was then 
open for period 3. 
- When period 3 ended, a subject flipped a coin to determine the dividend from the two 
remaining dividends. If the flip was heads the dividend was the lower of the two dividends 
and if it was tails the higher dividend was used. 
Instructions for these experiments can be found in Appendix B. The experiment was 
repeated with the same cohort of traders and with the same procedures.
4 Earnings were paid 
in cash at the end of the second experimental session. 
                                                            
4 The second experimental session was announced at the end of the first session.   9
In the ambiguity treatment, each session used five separate opaque bags containing 
colored marbles. The quantities and proportions of marbles in each bag were left unknown. 
All bags were placed in the front of the room prior to subjects entering the lab, and 
remained in subject view during the entirety of the experiment. The marble composition of 
the bags was as follows. 
•  Bag 1: Light Blue and Dark Blue 
•  Bag 2: Red, Yellow, and Green 
•  Bag 3: Red and Yellow 
•  Bag 4: Yellow and Green 
•  Bag 5: Red and Green 
Before starting the first period of trading, a subject was selected to flip a coin and 
another to roll a die. The result of the coin toss was announced to everyone by the subject 
and this determined whether the Light Blue marbles in Bag 1 represented the high 
{100,200,300}, or the low set of dividends {50,100,150}. The result of the die roll was also 
announced. This determined what color marble (Red, Yellow, or Green) in Bag 2 
represented which dividend level (high, medium or low). This procedure avoided subject 
suspicion regarding possible attempts of the experimenter to select the value of marbles that 
would minimize the cost of the experiment. 
Each time subjects flipped a coin, roll a die or draw a marble, the experimenter wrote 
the corresponding information on a white board located above the marble bags. Both the 
white board and the marble bags were visible to the eight subjects in the session. Without 
any further information subjects then traded the asset in period 1. 
At the end of period 1, a subject was chosen to draw a marble from Bag 1. Without 
being able to observe the contents of the bag, the subject drew a marble and announced it to 
everyone. Subjects were informed again that the final dividend would be selected from the 
set associated with the color drawn. Subjects now traded assets in period 2.  10
After period 2 was completed, a different subject was again chosen to draw a marble 
from Bag 2. Again, without being able to observe the contents of the bag, the subject drew 
a marble and announced it to everyone. Subjects were then informed that the final dividend 
would NOT be the value associated with the color drawn. Subjects now traded in period 3. 
At the end of period 3, a different subject was chosen to draw a marble from Bag 3, 4 or 
5 depending on the color of the marble drawn from Bag 2. If the marble drawn from Bag 2 
was Green (Red) [Yellow] then the subject used the bag with the two remaining colored 
marbles, that is, Bag 3 (Bag 4) [Bag 5]. 
Without being able to observe the contents of the bag, the subject drew the final marble 
and announced it to everyone. The dividend value for this session was the value associated 
with the marble drawn. 
As in the baseline, subjects were then informed that they were going to repeat a new 
market. The five bags used in the first experimental session were then replaced by the 
experimenter. In full view of the subjects the experimenter placed the old bags on the floor 
and the new ones on the table. As a result, no learning about the composition of the bags 
used in first session could occur in the second experimental session. 
Given the complicated procedure, the experimenter went through a practice run inviting 
subjects to flip a coin, roll a die and draw marbles before each experiment actually started. 
The experiment was repeated with the same cohort of traders and with the same parameters. 
Instructions for the ambiguity treatment can be found in Appendix B. Earnings were paid in 
cash at the end of the second experimental session. On completion of the experiment 
subjects were called up individually to be paid their private earnings from both sessions 
plus a $7 dollar show up fee. Average earnings for both the ambiguity and the baseline 




Table 1: Experimental Design 
Number of traders per session  Endowment Trading  mechanism 
8 traders for each of the 12 experimental 
sessions (6 baseline sessions and 6 
ambiguity sessions) with a repetition 
3 subjects with 450 cents in 
cash and 3 shares 
2 subjects with 600 cents in 
cash and 2 shares 
3 subjects with 750 cents in 






III. Experimental Results 
In the first subsection, we compare the baseline and the ambiguity treatments. We look at 
aggregate market measures such as average asset prices, volatility, and trading volumes. 
This is followed by an analysis of trader reaction to news to public information released in 
periods 2 and 3. Finally, we analyze subjects’ individual trading behavior.  
III.1. Aggregate analysis: Asset prices, Volatility and Trading volumes 
We first look at average asset prices in the first period of trading in the baseline and 
ambiguity treatments. In the baseline treatment the two dividend distributions, 
{50,100,150} and {100,200,300} are equally likely. Meanwhile, in the ambiguity treatment 
subjects are unaware of the likelihood of occurrence of each regime. Note that, no public 
news has been released in the first period of trading. Thus, any difference in asset prices, 
volatility or trading volumes across the treatments can only be attributed to the existence of 
ambiguity (i.e. in the likelihood of occurrence of dividend regimes). This is, however, not 
the case in periods 2 and 3, since information about the regime is released in the second 
period while information about dividends is released in the third period. As a result, 
differences in asset prices, volatility or trading volumes in periods 2 and 3 between 
treatments cannot be uniquely attributed to ambiguity effects. If observed, the differences  12
could also be a consequence of the release of public information, as well as any interaction 
effect between ambiguity and trader reaction to news. 
We start by testing Hypothesis 1 regarding the existence of an ambiguity premium 
in asset prices for inexperienced subjects. One can see from table 2 that first-period average 
asset prices are significantly lower than the fundamental value of 150 in the baseline 
treatment.
5 Interestingly, asset prices are not significantly different from the fundamental 
value in the ambiguity treatment. It seems that subjects disregard probabilities and average 
out the five possible dividend values (50, 100, 150, 200, 300).
6 For inexperienced subjects, 
average asset prices under the ambiguity treatment (165.2) are significantly greater 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, p-value = 0.0649) relative to the baseline (118.7).
7 Our results 
lead us to reject Hypothesis 1 regarding the existence of an ambiguity premium in asset 
prices. 
Our result contrasts with experimental studies that have emphasized the existence of 
an ambiguity premium in experimental asset markets (Sarin and Weber, (1993)). However, 
one should point out that the results in Sarin and Weber (1993) are obtained when 
ambiguous and unambiguous assets are traded simultaneously. We find that the ambiguity 
premium is not observed if ambiguous and unambiguous assets are not traded 
simultaneously. The most intriguing part of our result is that, compared to the baseline 
treatment, average asset prices for inexperienced subjects are significantly larger in the 
ambiguity treatment. This could be an indication of the presence of animal spirits as is 
suggested in Epstein and Wang (1994). To quote Shiller (2000, p137): “in ambiguous 
situations peoples decisions are affected by whatever anchor is at hand”. This may make it 
difficult to predict asset prices in the presence of ambiguity. However, average asset prices 
do not significantly differ between the ambiguity and baseline treatments for experienced 
subjects (see table 3). 
                                                            
5 In Appendix C, we provide an analysis of asset prices for periods 2 and 3. For further periods, each 
experimental session is characterized by different fundamentals so that we analyze average mispricing 
measures instead of average asset prices. Our basic results are confirmed in the sense that no ambiguity 
premium appears whether we consider inexperienced or experienced subjects. 
6 A one-sided Wilcoxon Rank Sum test with alternative hypothesis: median asset prices are greater than 150 
[160] leads to a p-value equal to 0.103 [0.173]. 
7 Average asset prices are below the expected dividend value in the baseline suggesting the typical risk-
aversion pattern of asset prices found in experimental asset markets (Smith et al. 1988, Lei et al. 2001).  13
Table 2: Comparison of first-period average (median) asset prices: 
Ambiguity vs. Baseline 
  Inexperienced subjects  Experienced subjects 
Baseline  118.7 (109.5)  156.2 (160.7) 
Ambiguity  165.2 (180.2)  163.3 (155.6) 
 Wilcoxon two-sided Rank Sum test (p-value) 
Mean (Median) prices  
Baseline vs. Ambiguity 
p-value = 0.0649 (0.0198)  p-value = 0.8182 (0.6879) 
Null hypothesis: 
Mean asset price = 150. 
Alternative hypothesis: 
Mean asset price ≠150. 
Baseline 
p-value = 0.0938 (0.0452) 
Baseline 
p-value = 0.6875 (0.5625) 
Ambiguity 
p-value = 1.000 (0.2463) 
Ambiguity 
p-value = 0.4375 (0.8326) 
 
Epstein and Wang (1994) suggest that ambiguity may result in increased volatility 
of asset prices (Hypothesis 2i). We find support for this hypothesis only for inexperienced 
subjects. Relative to the baseline, the presence of ambiguity increases volatility in asset 
prices by more than 73%. Table 3 shows the standard deviation of prices in period 1. Notice 
that the standard deviation of asset prices in the first period sharply decreases with 
experience in the ambiguity treatment. Actually, standard deviation is not significantly 
different between the ambiguity and baseline treatments for experienced subjects. 
Table 3: Comparison of first-period asset prices standard deviation: 
Ambiguity vs. Baseline 
  Inexperienced subjects  Experienced subjects 
Baseline  36.79 26.94 
Ambiguity  63.69 41.38 
Mean comparison: Baseline vs. Ambiguity treatments 
P-values: Wilcoxon two-sided [one-
sided] Rank Sum tests 
 
p-value = 0.132 [0.066]  p-value = 0.937 [0.591]  14
 
Note, however, that a general analysis of volatility requires controlling for the 
underlying fundamental value of the asset in each experimental period of each experimental 
session. To that end, we use the dispersion ratio measure proposed by Palan (2009). The 
dispersion ratio in period t is defined as the sample ratio of asset prices in period t divided 
by population standard deviation of the fundamental value of the asset in the same period. 
This allows us to compare across sessions and periods with different underlying 
fundamental values. 
In the following regressions we assess the treatment effect on asset price volatility 
in periods 2 and 3, respectively. We control for the treatment by introducing a dummy that 
takes value one for ambiguity sessions and zero otherwise. We show that, regardless of 
experience, ambiguity does not affect volatility significantly in periods 2 and 3. The 
dummy variable for treatment is not statistically significant in any of the regressions 
displayed in table 4. This finding rejects Hypothesis 2i). However, one has to be cautious in 
the interpretation of these results. The effect of ambiguity, or its absence, can be 
confounded with the effect, or lack of it, of the release of public information in periods 2 
and 3. Notice that in the regression results of table 4, dispersion ratios in a given period 
depend positively on the previous period dispersion ratio for inexperienced traders. This 
positive relationship, however, does not hold in the case of experienced subjects. 
Table 4: OLS estimates for inexperienced and experienced traders
8 




Dispersion Ratio Period 3  Dispersion Ratio Period 2 
Inexperienced Experienced  Inexperienced  Experienced 
Intercept  -0.61 28.46  7.74  20.73 
Treatment  -0.40 7.65  -3.07  -10.91 
Dispersion  0.96*** -0.28  -  - 
                                                            
8 The OLS regressions presented in the analysis passed the Jarque-Bera Normality test. In addition, we also 
control for heteroskedasticity by using White standard errors. 
9 We consider standard statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. Significance at these levels are 
indicated in the regression table by the respective symbols ***, ** and *.  15
Ratio Period 2 
Dispersion 
Ratio Period 1 
-0.10 -0.12 0.50**  0.30 
R squared  0.72 0.08  0.54  0.28 
 
Finally, we study the effect of ambiguity on trading volumes. Regardless of subject 
experience, trading volumes across the baseline (26) and the ambiguity treatment (26.8) are 
similar. Despite increased asset prices and standard deviation in the first period, ambiguity 
sessions do not generate significant differences in trade volumes. Table 5 presents the 
average volumes for the two treatments. Recall that according to Hypothesis 2ii), regardless 
of experience, trading volumes are expected to be lower in the ambiguity sessions (Dow 
and Werlang 1992, Mukerji and Tallon 2001). Our results lead us to reject Hypothesis 
2ii).
10 
Table 5: Comparison of first-period (total) trading volume: 
Ambiguity vs. Baseline 
  Inexperienced subjects  Experienced subjects 
Baseline  26 (62.2)  14.3 (31.2) 
Ambiguity  26.8 (56)  15.8 (32.8) 
P-values: Wilcoxon two-sided Rank 
Sum tests 
(Mean comparison between Baseline 
and Ambiguity treatments) 
p-value = 0.686 (0.818)  p-value = 0.630 (0.699) 
 




10 Our results are similar to experimental asset markets that show that trading volumes decrease with 
experience (Smith et al.1988, Lei et al. 2001). We test this hypothesis using a Wilcoxon one-sided Rank Sum 
test and we obtain a p-value of 0.014 for the aggregate sample (ambiguity and baseline sessions are pooled) 
and p-values of 0.074 and 0.063 for the baseline and ambiguity treatments, respectively.  16
  Result 1: First-period asset prices, volume and volatility under ambiguity. 
i)  For inexperienced subjects, relative to baseline experiments, average asset prices in 
the first period are significantly higher in the ambiguity treatment. With experienced 
subjects, first-period average asset prices are not significantly different between the two 
treatments. We find no evidence of an ambiguity premium in our environment. 
ii)  For inexperienced subjects, compared to the baseline treatment, the standard 
deviation of asset prices in the first period is significantly higher in the ambiguity 
treatment. With experienced subjects, first-period standard deviation of asset prices is not 
significantly different between the two treatments. We find support for Hypothesis 2i) for 
inexperienced subjects while rejecting it for experienced subjects. 
iii)  Regardless of subject experience, trading activity is not significantly different 
between the ambiguity treatment and the baseline. This leads us to reject Hypothesis 2ii).  
In the next subsection we test Hypothesis 3 and analyze trader reaction to public 
news (released in periods 2 and 3). 
 
 
III.2. Reaction to News 
We now analyze the reaction of asset prices and individual trading behavior to the 
release of public news about dividend regimes (in period 2) and dividend values (in period 
3). The main purpose of our experimental design is to analyze reaction to news in asset 
market with and without ambiguity. We conduct our analysis in two parts. We first focus 
on the direction of price changes (Hypothesis 3i) and then we study its magnitude 
(Hypothesis 3ii). We first analyze whether price changes are consistent with the release of 
either good or bad news before analyzing the possibility of under-, or over-, reaction to 
public news. 
III.2.1. Direction of price changes 
We study reaction to news by first looking at the direction of price changes 
following the release of public news. Any piece of news that increases (decreases) the  17
expected value of dividend streams associated with the asset is classified as “good news” 
(“bad news”). We develop a simple ordinal measure of the direction of price changes with 
respect to the news received by traders in periods 2 and 3. We classify the evolution of 
average asset prices in period t (Pt) as follows. 
Definition 1: (Consistent price changes) If Pt – Pt-1 > 0 [Pt – Pt-1 < 0] for t∈{2,3}, then a 
change in average prices in period t is consistent with the release of good [bad] news in 
period t∈{2,3}.
11 
We display the information on consistent price changes across treatments and periods in 
table 6. 
Table 6: Proportion of consistent price changes: 
Inexperienced [experienced] traders (by treatments and periods) 
  Period 2  Period 3  Total 
Baseline  4/6 [5/6]  2/2 [3/3]  6/8 [8/9] 
Ambiguity  5/6 [5/6]  3/3 [1/3]  8/9 [6/9] 
Inexperienced vs. 
experienced 
9/12 [10/12]  5/5 [4/6]  14/17 [14/18] 
 
We observe a very-high proportion of consistent price changes both in the baseline 
(82.4%) and the ambiguity treatment (77.8%). A Chi-squared proportions test tells us that 
the (proportions) are significantly different from 50% (p-values of 0.012 and 0.031, 
respectively). Subjects in experienced sessions exhibit a greater consistency levels in price 
changes (82.4% vs. 77.8% for inexperienced). This difference in proportions is, however, 
not significant (p-value = 0.7352).  
In table C.1 (appendix), we summarize the rest of our results comparing the 
proportion of consistent price changes among treatments, periods, and levels of experience. 
We find that levels of consistent price changes are not significantly different across 
                                                            
11 Notice that, at the end of period 2 the information delivered to subjects may be neutral. In this case we 
should not expect price changes. Definition 1 restricts our analysis to the case in which either bad or good 
news is released before the start of period 3. This is the reason why the number of price changes in period 3 
considered for inexperienced and experienced sessions is only equal to five and six (table 6), respectively. A 
separate analysis of neutral news is available upon request. In particular, we do not find any significant 
differences in the reaction of asset prices with respect to neutral news across treatments.  18
treatments, periods or, levels of experience. In particular, the presence of ambiguity does 
not preclude inexperienced traders from reacting consistently to news. Interestingly, 
reaction to public information in the ambiguity sessions, far from being indeterminate and 
subject to possible animal spirits, is consistent with the news released. This tells us that, in 
the context of ambiguity, the release of information may lead to consistent reactions as it 
reduces ambiguity. In the absence of a determinate equilibrium in asset prices, following 
Shiller’s argument, one can think of public news as a benchmark for trading. Our results on 
the consistency of asset prices changes are summarized in Result 2 below. We confirm 
Hypothesis 3i) under which we expect no differences in consistency of price changes across 
treatments and levels of experience. 
 
Result 2: (Consistent price changes)  
i)  The proportion of consistent average price changes is not significantly different 
between the ambiguity and the baseline treatments. This is true regardless of 
subject experience. 
ii)  Compared to experienced subjects, the proportion of consistent price changes is not 
significantly different for inexperienced subjects. 
iii)  The proportion of consistent price changes is not significantly different between 
periods 2 and 3. 
 
Even though we do not observe significant differences in price change consistency across 
treatments and levels of experience at the aggregate level, we still need to verify whether 
the results are maintained for the individual analysis. To do this we first need to provide a 
measure of individual reactions to news released in period t. This can be done by assessing 
trader valuation of an asset in any given period (Vt ) and then measure the difference in the 
trader’s valuation of the asset across periods t-1 and t. A natural definition of a trader’s 
valuation of the asset in period t has to depend on a (trader’s) offers to buy and sell in the 
given period. In particular, this valuation has to depend on the bid-ask spread. In the  19




Definition 2: (Traders’ valuation of the asset) Trader i’s valuation of the asset in period t 
is determined as an arithmetic average of trader i’s bids and asks, that is, Vi,t = ½×(Average 
bid of trader i in period t + Average ask of trader i in period t). 
 
We now identify correct trading responses to news in period t when a trader’s valuation 
increases (decreases) after the release of good (bad) news at the end of period t-1. 
 
Definition 3: (Correct individual trading responses) If Vi,t – Vi,t-1 > 0 [Vi,t – Vi,t-1 < 0] for t ∈ 
{2, 3} then we consider that the trading response of individual i in period t is correct if 
good [bad] news has been released in period t∈{2,3}. 
We first compare the proportion of correct individual responses to news using 
proportion tests. This analysis is summarized in the following table. 
Table 7: Proportion of correct individual responses to news: 
Inexperienced [experienced] traders (by treatments and periods) 
 Period  2  Period  3  Total 
Baseline  69.0% [92.1%]  43.5% [88.2%]  60.0% [90.9%] 
Ambiguity  76.6% [90.0%]  95.0% [47.4%]  82.1% [76.3%] 
Aggregate (Baseline & 
Ambiguity) 
73.0% [91.0%]  67.4% [66.7%]  71.2% [83.3%] 
 
At the individual level we find significant differences in consistency of price 
changes across treatments and experience levels. A significant difference in the proportion 
                                                            
12 We have used alternative measures of trader’s valuation of the asset in period t (such as average bids or 
average asks in period t or last bid or ask in period t). Our results are maintained (summarized in Result 3) 
with these alternative measures.  20
of correct individual responses to news between inexperienced (83.3%) and experienced 
subjects (71.2%) is observed.
13 
It seems ambiguity leads to more accurate responses to news for inexperienced 
subjects (82.1% vs. 60% in baseline). This difference is statistically significant (see table 
C.2 in the appendix). This result confirms that ambiguity leads to surprisingly accurate 
reactions to news both at the aggregate (Result 2) and the individual level. This (positive) 
effect of ambiguity is especially relevant given that experimental asset markets with news 
have been characterized by a high degree of inertia where subjects fail to fully adjust to 
news in a given period (Lin and Rassenti, 2010). The release of information in ambiguity 
sessions is particularly relevant for traders as it informs them about the fundamental value 
of the asset and reduces uncertainty about the intrinsic value of the asset at the same time. 
However, the positive effect of ambiguity on trading response accuracy diminishes with 
time. In the baseline treatment the proportion of correct trading responses increased from 
60% to 90.9% with experience. In the ambiguity treatment, the proportion of correct trading 
responses does not increase. This is due to the fact that the proportion of these responses 
was already particularly high (82.1%) in the first session with inexperienced subjects. 
Reaction to news in the two treatments is highlighted by looking at experimental 
sessions with inexperienced traders, in the third period, with a high regime of dividends and 
positive news, and another session in which the regime of dividends was low and the news 
negative. We observe that the reaction to news in both treatments moves in line with 
fundamentals (Figure 1a). At the end of each period, transaction prices are particularly 
close to the fundamental value. However, in the inexperienced session, with a low dividend 
regime and bad news on dividends (Figure 1b), the baseline session is characterized by 
prices that do not move in the direction of the fundamental value. Meanwhile, the reaction 
of asset prices in the corresponding ambiguity session is correct and particularly fast. 
Figure 1a: Baseline session (on the left panel) and ambiguity session (right panel) with high 
regime and good news 
 
                                                            































Figure 1b: Baseline session (on the left panel) and ambiguity session (right panel) with low 



























Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Prices 22
Our results on individual trading responses are summarized below. 
 
Result 3: (Individual trading responses to news) 
Compared to the baseline, for inexperienced subjects the proportion of correct trading 
responses is significantly higher for the ambiguity treatment. 
 
We confirm Result 3 by using regression analysis where we control for the news 
that is actually released in the different experimental sessions (see table C.3 for additional 
regressions). Indeed, whether the dividend regime is high or low or, the news in period 3 
good or bad, affects the patterns of asset prices and trading behavior. 
In order to construct the dependent variable for our regression analysis, we define 
the binary variable CPRi,t for t∈{2,3}, where CPRi,t = 1 [0] if individual i’s response to the 
news released in period t is [not] correct. The dependent variable is defined as the total 
number of correct responses to news of a given subject i in periods 2 and 3: CPRi,2 + CPRi,3 
∈ {0, 1, 2}. In table 8, we present the regression results of the following specification. 
 
(1)  CPRi,2 + CPRi,3 = β0 + β1×Treatment(i) + β2×News2(i) + β3× News3(i) + ε(i) 
We introduce a dummy treatment variable as a regressor (that takes value of one if 
the subjects participated in the ambiguity session). The other regressors correspond to the 
variable Newst. Newst measures the change in the fundamental value of the asset in period t. 
That is, it measures the change in the expected value of dividend streams between period t 
and t-1 after the release of the news at the end of period t-1. Newst is positive (negative) 
when the news at the end of period t-1 is good (bad). In the case of inexperienced subjects 
we find that the dummy treatment variable is positive and significant in the regressions of 
the total number of subjects’ correct responses in periods 2 and 3 (table 8, left column). 
 
Table 8: Poisson count estimates for inexperienced [experienced] traders 
Dependent variables: correct trading responses in periods 2 and 3 




           Inexperienced                         Experienced 
Intercept  -0.09 0.75**  23
Treatment  0.64** -0.35 
News in period 2  0.26 -0.176 
News in period 3  0.09 0.06 
R squared  0.44 0.22 
 
 
III.2.2. Analysis of the magnitude of price changes 
We now test Hypothesis 3ii) and assess whether changes in asset prices are over-, or under, 
reaction to news. Our previous analysis on price change consistency and correct trading 
responses does not inform us about the magnitude of price changes. As a result, we 
complement the analysis by defining the concepts of over- and under-reaction to news as 
follows. 
Definition 4: (Asset price changes classification) For t∈{2, 3}, a change in average asset 
prices between periods t and t-1 is classified as under-reaction [over-reaction] if: 
 
i) It is consistent and Pt – Pt-1 < Newst [Pt – Pt-1 > Newst] in case of good news; or  
ii) It is consistent and Pt – Pt-1  > Newst [Pt – Pt-1 < Newst] in case of bad news. 
 
The classification of price over-, under-, reaction and consistency is reported in table 9. 
For each treatment, we aggregate price under- and over-reaction for periods 2 and 3. A first 
look at the table suggests that the proportion of price changes characterized as over- and 
under-reactions to news is similar across treatments. Using Definition 5, we test this 





Table 9: Classification of asset price changes for inexperienced [experienced] traders by treatments
14 
 Over-reaction  Under-reaction  Inconsistent 
Baseline  3/8 [5/9]  3/8 [3/9]  2/8 [1/9] 
Ambiguity  3/9 [3/9]  3/9 [3/9]  3/9 [3/9] 
Aggregate (Baseline & 
Ambiguity) 
6/17 [8/18]  6/17 [6/18]  5/17 [4/18] 
 
Definition 5: (Over- and under-reaction in asset markets) An asset market is 
characterized by under-reaction [over-reaction] if the proportion of asset price changes 
classified as under-reaction [over-reaction] is significantly larger than the proportion of 
asset price changes classified as over-reaction [under-reaction]. 
 
In table C.4 (appendix) we provide a summary of the tests for the presence of over- 
or under-reaction in ambiguity and baseline treatments. Our findings are summarized in 
Result 4. 
 
Result 4: (Over- and under-reaction to news)  
Neither the baseline, nor the ambiguity, treatments are characterized by a significantly 
larger proportion of asset price changes that are classified as either over- or under-
reaction to news. This result holds regardless of subject experience. 
This finding is in line with Fama’s critique (1998) that downplays the robustness of 
studies showing under- or over-reaction of asset prices to news. We confirm Hypothesis 
3ii) that states that over-reaction in asset prices is not more likely than under-reaction in 
asset prices. This is true regardless of whether the underlying asset value is ambiguous or 
not. Result 4 is in line with Results 2 and 3 where we show that price changes are highly 
consistent to news regardless of subject experience and the ambiguity of the environment. 
                                                            
14 We classify a total of 17 price changes (8 inexperienced sessions and 9 experienced sessions) for the 
baseline sessions and 18 (9 inexperienced sessions and 9 experienced sessions) price changes for the 
ambiguity sessions. Recall that over the 24 price changes in the baseline (ambiguity) sessions, 7 (6) of them 
could not be qualified as either consistent or inconsistent.  25
Using regression analysis we confirm Result 4 where we assess the impact of news 
on average asset prices in periods 2 and 3. The dependent variable is the average asset price 
in periods 2 and 3 in a given experimental session. We control for the level of mispricing in 
the previous period. We define it as the difference between average asset prices in period t 
and the fundamental value of the asset in that period. The fundamental value of the asset in 
period t is computed as the expected dividend stream given the information released up to 
that period.  
Controlling for asset mispricing in previous periods is important in order to measure 
asset prices reaction to the release of news in a given period. For example, an increase in 
asset prices in the second period of trading may be either due to the release of good news or 
to a positive trend in asset prices (i.e. prices were much lower than the fundamental value in 
the first period). We also introduce a treatment dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
the session corresponds to the ambiguity treatment.
15 In addition, we incorporate an 
interaction variable between the treatment dummy and the news variable 
(Treatment×News). This variable measures whether reaction to news is significantly 
different across treatments. Finally, we introduce a dummy variable that takes value of one 
for experienced subjects.
16 
We estimated the following regressions. 
(2) P2(i) = β0 + β1×News2(i) + β2×Treatment(i) + β3×[Treatment(i)×News2(i)] + 
β4×Mispricing in period 1(i) + β5×experience(i) + ε(i) 
(3) P3(i) = β0 + β1×News3(i)+β2×News2(i) + β3×Treatment(i) + 
β4×[Treatment(i)×News3(i)] + β5×Mispricing in period 2(i) + β6×experience(i) + ε(i) 
 
 
Table 10: OLS estimates of the regression of average asset prices on news  
Coefficients (P-values)  P2  P3 
Intercept 152.18*** 157.02*** 
News,2  0.90*** 1.07*** 
News,3  - 1.11*** 
                                                            
15 This variable allows us to control for the fact that prices may be systematically different across treatments 
(as seen in the case of inexperienced traders in Result 1). 
16 In contrast with individual trading behavior regressions (table 8) we do not consider separate regressions 
for experienced and inexperienced sessions. The rationale is that we have much less data available in our 
aggregate analysis compared to the analysis of individual data.  26
Treatment  9.42 -9.77 
Treatment×News,2  -0.36 - 
Treatment×News,3  - -1.09** 
Mispricing in previous period  0.08  1.06*** 
Experience -9.92  -1.99 
R squared  0.54 0.79 
 
In both the regressions the coefficient for news is highly significant. This confirms 
that asset prices significantly react to news. Using a Wald test we cannot reject that the β1 
coefficient (associated with current period news) is equal to one. For the regression of asset 
prices in period 2 and 3, the p-values are 0.690 and 0.730, respectively. This means that an 
increase (decrease) of one monetary unit in the fundamental value of the asset is followed 
by an increase (decrease) of the same magnitude in average asset prices in the period in 
which the news have been released. This result confirms the absence of under- or over-
reaction as established previously using non-parametric tests. The only effect associated 
with ambiguity is due to the significance of the interaction coefficient between the 
treatment dummy and news in period 3. This coefficient tells us that in the ambiguity 
treatment the reaction to news in period 3 is significantly more negative. This result is 
consistent with Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Leippold et al. (2007) that show that 




III.3. Individual trading behavior 
In this section, we study individual trading behavior. Our main objective is to assess the 
level of sophistication of trading behavior and study how it is affected by ambiguity 
(Hypothesis 4). From Epstein and Wang 1994, we know that the possible indeterminacy in 
equilibrium prices may imply that asset prices follow animal spirits in the presence of 
                                                            
17 Period 3 results should be interpreted with care since our aggregate analysis of price reaction to news is 
based on only 11 sessions (5 sessions with inexperienced subjects and 6 sessions with experienced subjects). 
This is due to the fact that we drop the observations corresponding to the release of neutral news in period 2.  27
ambiguity. As a result, behavior would be less consistent and (less) rational under 
ambiguity, than under the baseline treatment. 
We first establish some measures that capture different aspects of subject trading 
behavior. We start by defining subject trading behavior as being inconsistent in a given 
period whenever he is willing to sell an asset at a price lower than what he would be willing 
to pay for it. The analysis follows the definitions of absolute and average inconsistent 
trading behavior. 
Definition 5.1: (Basic inconsistency) Basic inconsistent trading behavior is observed for a 
subject in a given period if his minimum offer to sell is strictly lower than his maximum 
offer to buy. The index of basic inconsistency of a given trader is measured as the sum of 
all periods for which the subject exhibits absolutely inconsistent behavior. This index 
equals 3 for fully inconsistent subjects and is equal to 0 when subjects are fully consistent. 
 
Definition 5.2: (Average inconsistency) Average inconsistent trading behavior is observed 
for a subject in a given period if his average offer to sell is strictly lower than his average 
offer to buy. The index of average inconsistency of a given trader is measured as the sum of 
all periods for which the subject exhibits average inconsistent behavior. This index equals 3 
for fully inconsistent subjects and is equal to 0 when subjects are fully consistent. 
 
Next, we consider another measure of trading behavior following Lei et al. (2001). 
We define extreme market behavior of participants as follows: 
 
Definition 6: (Extreme under- and over-pricing) A subject exhibits extreme pricing 
behavior whenever his transaction price is higher than the maximum possible (300 in 
period 1), or lower than the minimum possible (50 in period 1), dividend. 
 
Below, we define individual mispricing behavior. This is a measure that captures 
how far from the fundamental value each subject is actually trading.  
 
Definition 7: (Individual mispricing behavior) A subject’s individual mispricing 
behavior is defined as ∑|Pit – ft| / (100×16). Where, Pit is the price of the i
th transaction in  28
period t, the total number of shares is 16 and 100 is a normalization scalar. Also, ft is the 
fundamental value of the asset in period t measured as the expected value of dividend 
streams given the information released up to period t. For a given subject we only consider 
the transactions for which he is buying [selling] at a price that is larger [lower] than 
fundamentals. 
Using correlation analysis, we observe that the four measures are positively and 
significantly correlated (see table C.5 in appendix). This positive and significant correlation 
is in line with our initial objective that consisted in developing alternative measures of the 
same construct: traders’ sophistication. In table 11, we report the average values of the 
different measures for the two treatments. 
Table 11: Average measures of individual trading behaviour for the baseline and the ambiguity treatments 









Baseline  1.12 [0.90]  0.52 [0.38]  1.67 [0.33]  25.18 [34.99] 




1.28 [0.93]  0.61 [0.37]  4.42 [0.58]  41.86 [45.36] 
 
We compare these measures across treatments and experience levels in table C.6 in 
the appendix. We report significant differences across treatments for the four measures. The 
ambiguity sessions are characterized by much higher levels of inconsistency, extreme 
pricing, mispricing and trading than the baseline treatment. These differences are not 
significant for experienced subjects. Ambiguity modifies individual trading behavior 
resulting in inexperienced subjects to be more likely to exhibit inconsistent behavior and 
trade at prices that are far away from the fundamental value of the asset.  
 
Result 5: (Individual trading behavior and ambiguity) 
Compared to the baseline, inexperienced subjects in the ambiguity treatment exhibit 
significantly greater inconsistency in trading behavior, extreme pricing and mispricing. No  29
significant differences are observed in individual trading behavior between the ambiguity 
and the baseline treatments for experienced subjects. 
Result 5 confirms Hypothesis 4 that states that the sophistication in trading behavior 
is likely to be lower in the presence of ambiguity. This implies that asset prices may be 
driven by animal spirits (Epstein and Wang 1994). Interestingly, the different measures of 
trader sophistication are not magnified by the presence of ambiguity for experienced 
subjects. This result is in line with Results 1 to 4 as it confirms that the effect of ambiguity 




Research in behavioral finance makes specific predictions about the existence of price 
under- and over-reaction (e.g. Daniel et al. 1998 and Barberis et al. 1998). In this paper, we 
use a standard double auction experimental asset market to study the reaction of asset prices 
to public news. We find that prices do not over or under-react to news and consistently 
move in the direction of the fundamental value. Interestingly, the absence of under-or over-
reaction to news is robust to the introduction of ambiguity in the fundamental value of the 
asset. Specifically, we control for the presence of ambiguity in our experimental asset 
markets by designing two distinct environments in which the distribution of dividends is 
either known (risky asset) or unknown (ambiguous asset) to the traders. 
  Furthermore, we compare market variables in the risky and ambiguous 
environments and find no support for the existence of an ambiguity premium. Contrary to 
expectations, prices in the ambiguity treatment are actually higher than the baseline, and are 
closer to the fundamental value. This difference is only significant for inexperienced 
subjects. In the absence of experience ambiguity tends to generate greater levels of 
volatility in asset prices compared to the risky environment. In addition, we find that 
ambiguity sessions are characterized by greater amount of inconsistent behavior, extreme 
pricing and mispricing than the baseline treatment. This may be due to the existence of 
                                                            
18 We ran tests to see if there was a correlation between individual ambiguity aversion, as measured in 
Dickhaut and Wilcox (2009), and individual trading behavior as measured by basic and average 
inconsistency, extreme pricing and mispricing and found no significant correlations.  We did find some 
evidence that risk-averse subject trade less.  30
animal spirits that drive the evolution of asset prices in a context of ambiguity in which 
equilibrium prices are indeterminate (Epstein and Wang 1994). 
  However, any difference in asset prices, volatility and individual behavior 
disappears with experience. This suggests that any anomaly in trading behavior that would 
follow from the presence of ambiguity is only short-lived.  
Our experiments point towards several future directions of research. For example, it 
would be interesting to analyze asset markets with different forms of ambiguity. A 
possibility could be to introduce ambiguity both in the fundamental value of the asset as 
well as in the information. Another possibility would be to consider not only public but, 
also private, information (Daniel et al. 1998) to further study the effect of ambiguity on 
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Appendix A: Individual choice tests 
Figure A.1: Example of choice between risky lotteries  34
 
 
Figure A.2: Example of choice between an ambiguous lottery and a risky lottery 
 
 
Figure A.1 represent examples of lottery choices presented to the subjects. The subjects’ 
choice task involves indicating their preference of lotteries. In Figure 1, the choice is 
between the sure outcome of $24 and the lottery with outcomes of $48 with probability ¾ 
and $8 with probability ¼.  35
In Figure A.2, the choice is between the probabilistically known lottery ($8 with probability 
½, $24 with probability ¼, and $48 with outcome ¼) and the probabilistically ambiguous 
lottery ($8 with unknown probability α, and $48 with unknown probability 1-α). 
 
Appendix B: Instructions 









































































































































‐ If a 2 is rolled then Red is low, Green is middle and Yellow is high.
‐ If a 3 is rolled then Yellow is low, Red is middle and Green is high.
‐ If a 4 is rolled then Yellow is low, Green is middle and Red is high.
‐ If a 5 is rolled then Green is low, Red is middle and Yellow is high.




































































I. Mispricing analysis 
Mispricing is defined as the difference between average price and fundamental 
value (the expected value of the future stream of dividends). Average mispricing in the 
baseline treatment is -31.3. Given that the fundamental value of the asset in the baseline 
treatment is 150 in period 1, this suggests that subjects trade below t he fundamental value. 
The results for the ambiguity treatment go in the opposite direction. Subjects trade above 
the fundamental value in the presence of ambiguity. The magnitude of mispricing is 15.2 
for the ambiguity treatment. The extent of the deviation from the fundamental value is 
nearly 50% less than the baseline treatment. Our results suggest that information cognition 
with less information differs among subjects relative to the baseline treatment where 
information is clearer. It may be the case that subjects pay more attention to the problem at 
hand under ambiguity. This may suggest better information cognition under ambiguity. 
This difference is, however, not maintained when subjects are experienced. This result 
suggests that experts are less affected by ambiguity. 
We illustrate the patterns of average mispricing for sessions with inexperienced and 
experienced subjects in Figure C.1. One sees that the patterns of mispricing are 
significantly different between the ambiguity and the baseline treatment for inexperienced 
subjects. For experienced sessions both treatments are characterized by prices above 
















Figure C.1: Average mispricing per period for the baseline and the ambiguity treatment 




II. Additional statistical analysis 
 
 
Table C:1 P-values for two-sided proportion tests of consistent price changes:  
Inexperienced [experienced] traders (by treatments and periods) 
  Period 2  Period 3  Total 




p-value = 0.910 
[0.571] 
Inexperienced vs. experienced  p-value = 1.000  p-value = 0.521   
 
 
Table C.2: P-values for two-sided proportion tests of correct individual responses to news: 
Inexperienced [experienced] traders (by treatments and periods) 
 Period  2  Period  3  Total 





















SESSION 1  SESSION 2 53
Table C.3: Probit estimates for inexperienced [experienced] traders: 




Inexperienced             Experienced 
CPRi,1 
Inexperienced                 Experienced 
Intercept  0.71***   1.56***  0.06   1.20*** 
Treatment  0.41 -0.18 1.87***    -1.23** 
News in 
period 2 
0.69*** -0.21  0.74***    0.09 
News in 
period 3 
- -  -  - 
R squared  0.16 0.02  0.42  0.16 
 
 
Table C.4: P-values for two-sided tests comparing the proportion of price changes classified as under-reaction 
and over-reaction in the case of inexperienced [experienced] traders 
 Under-reaction  &  Over-reaction 
Baseline  p-value = 1.00 [0.343] 
Ambiguity  p-value = 1.000 [1.000] 
Aggregate (Baseline & Ambiguity)  p-value = 1.000 [0.494] 
 
 











Basic inconsistency  1.00  - -  - 
Average inconsistency  0.63***  1.00 - - 
Extreme pricing  0.33***  0.47*** 1.00  - 




Table C.6: P-values for two-sided Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests comparing different measures of individual 











p= 0.030 [0.402]  p = 0.012 [0.588]  p = 0.000 [0.340]  p = 0.000 [0.522] 
Experienced vs. 
Inexperienced 
p = 0.213  p = 0.679  p = 0.059  p = 0.640 
 
 
 
 
 
 